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Abstract: Based on detailed shipping figures for Suriname’s main harbour in Paramaribo, we estimate
the total shipments (in kilograms) of original and falsified medical products for 1996–2008 across five
product categories. Using various time series techniques and diffusion models, we document that
total cumulative shipments of falsified products make about 40% of total shipments. We observe
that there are apparently two distinct sets of consumers for original and for falsified products.
Subsequently, we survey more than 300 citizens of Suriname from various demographics and ask
questions about their potential adoption of falsified medicines. We find that income, age, and family
size have no correlation, while the way people are insured does. Hence, the two sets of consumers can
roughly be identified and clear-cut policy suggestions are presented. “The World Health Organization
(WHO) estimates that up to 1% of medicines available in the developed world is likely to be counterfeited. This
figure rises to 10% globally, although in some developing countries they estimate one third of medicines are
counterfeit” (Various internet sites consulted January 2010 and the best estimate we have).
Keywords: falsified products; medication; health risk; low-income country
1. Introduction
The diffusion of pharmaceutical products has received some attention in the recent literature; see
for example [1]. It has been documented that the diffusion patterns show various similarities with the
diffusion patterns of durable consumer goods, see for example [2]. As pharmaceutical products may
experience the impact of regulatory regimes, diffusion patterns may change direction and slope due
to these regimes, see for example [3]. In all studies available, there is a strong focus on the diffusion
patterns in western countries, usually driven by data availability, although [2] also include data for
various low-income countries. A common assumption across all studies is that the focus is on the
producer of the pharmaceutical products, usually the US or European companies.
In this paper we also address the diffusion patterns of pharmaceutical products, where we relegate
the focus on the actual shipments of such products in a low-income country. This change of focus then
naturally has to include the fact that in low-income countries often many pharmaceutical products are
potentially falsified products. The exact available amount of these falsified drugs is unknown, and
therefore we will first provide a method to estimate the fraction of falsified products within a single
low-income country.
Exact data on falsified drugs are usually not available, and certainly not in a low-income country.
One way to estimate the size of the falsified market is to try to disentangle the falsified diffusion from
the total diffusion, as is proposed in [4] for software products. An alternative would be to estimate it
directly from the shipments data, if these are available, see for example [5].
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The focus in the present paper is the diffusion of original and falsified medical products in the
South American country Suriname. Based on detailed data on shipments of products in five distinct
categories, we estimate the diffusion of original and falsified products for the sample from 1996 to
2008. With these data, we can analyze the correlations between the two diffusion patterns. Also, we
examine the lead and lag structure across original and falsified products. Finally, we estimate the total
cumulative shipments using the familiar Bass model, and we compare the total levels for each of the
categories. So, we provide estimates of the total amount that in the end will have found its way to
consumers, here in Suriname. Note that we are not interested in the actual figures, but merely in the
fraction of falsified products in the total amount.
One key main finding in this paper is that falsified drugs and other medical products eventually
make up around 40% of the total shipments in this particular country of Suriname. Note that this
fraction exceeds the estimates of the WHO. A second finding is that the two diffusion processes are
correlated contemporaneously, reacting similarly to the same outside shocks, but that there is no
significant lead or lag relationship. This suggests that the original and falsified products each address
a distinct segment of the market. This finding has led us to survey many individuals in Suriname and
to ask a range of questions. We aimed to find the distinctive features of the two groups of consumers,
and it seems that the key distinctive feature concerns insurance. Basically, poor insurance means that
people are more likely to opt for fake medication.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, in Section 2 we describe the first part of the data
collection which entails the creation of the two series for original and for falsified products. In Section 3
we analyze these data using basic time series techniques and familiar diffusion models. Section 4
continues with a discussion of the outcomes of a survey amongst more than 300 citizens of Suriname.
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the main findings and their implications.
2. Data Collection on Adoption over Time
We have collected data for the South American country of Suriname. It is a small and open
economy, with a single large (maritime) harbour in the capital city of Paramaribo. The country has
many natural resources. It used to be a colony of the Netherlands, before it became independent in
1975. Economic growth slowed down since the beginning of the 1980s, but since 2000 there has been
steady growth in GDP and an increase in welfare. The country is sparsely populated, with most of the
citizens living in the coastal area. Although average welfare is on the rise, the income inequalities in
Suriname are quite large. The country boasts a non-negligible group of multi-millionaires, but on the
other hand it is estimated that more than 60% of the population is below international poverty levels.
Sales records for medical products simply do not exist. Hence, we will have to estimate the
diffusion patterns of these products using alternative methods. We consulted the General Bureau of
Statistics (GBS) in Suriname and we were able to collect annual data on the imports of products in
five categories for the period 1996 to and including 2008. The product categories are: Pharmaceutical
items; Medicine, for sale small scale; Medicine, not for sale small scale; Wound-covering materials; and
Blood items. These imports are measured in kilograms and in total value (in US dollars). We decided
to take the weights as the measurement unit to avoid correction for inflation in the exporting countries.
Crucial for our purposes is that we have information on the countries of origin of the shipments. In
Appendix A, we give the countries of origin, and we indicate from which countries which products in
the five categories originate. Clearly, Suriname imports from a long list of countries, and there is also
variation across the categories.
To estimate the shipments of original products and falsified products, we use the software piracy
index, which can be obtained from www.nationmaster.com. This website presents a list of countries
and gives an estimate of the fraction of products (here: computer software) that are most likely falsified.
In Appendix B we provide a list of relevant countries for our product categories and the corresponding
percentages. Like this list, we shall take it as likely that 23% of the pharmaceutical products that
are imported from Japan amount to falsified products, and that as much as 82% of these products
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originating from China are falsified. Of course, we shall never be certain whether these percentages
also hold for our product categories, nor if this figure changes over time or amounts to a biased
estimate, and hence the subsequent data should not be considered as exact amounts, but merely as
estimates. At the same time, and for our purposes, the absolute numbers do not matter, as only their
time series properties do. In order to allow the reader to verify the computations about which we
report in the next section, we present our data in Appendix C. Graphical details and other aspects of
these series will be discussed in the next section.
3. Analysis of Shipments Data
This section deals with the statistical analysis of the two diffusion series. We analyze the levels of
the shipments, as in Appendix C, and the cumulated shipments. The latter are used to estimate the
eventual total size of the market. The first pairs of series are analyzed to see if there are leading or
lagging diffusion processes amongst the two series. We discuss the methodology, first for cumulative
shipments and then for shipments themselves, and we discuss the results in each of the five categories.
3.1. Methodology for Cumulative Shipments
We denote the level of the original products shipments as Ot and the level of the shipments of
falsified product as Ct where t = 1996, 1997, . . . , 2008. We also compute the cumulative shipments,
and label these as COt and CCt. Graphs of the series for the five categories appear in Figures 1–5. The
second panel of each of these figures suggests that the cumulative shipments obey a product life cycle
that can also be observed in the diffusion of durable products. Hence, the first part of our methodology
involves considering diffusion models to estimate the inflection points and the total levels of these
cumulative series.
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Figure 1. Shipments and cumulative shipments of original and falsified products:
Pharmaceutical items.
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Figure 2. Shipments and cumulative shipments of original and falsified products: Medicine, for sale
small scale. Vertical axis is the amount and horizontal axis is the year.
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Figure 3. Shipments and cumulative shipments of original and falsified products: Medicine, not for
sale small scale. Vertical axis is the amount and horizontal axis is the year.
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Figure 4. Shipments and cumulative shipments of original and falsified products: Wound covering
materials. Vertical axis is the amount and horizontal axis is the year.
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Figure 5. Shipments and cumulative shipments of original and falsified products: Blood items. Vertical
axis is the amount and horizontal axis is the year.
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For the COt and CCt variables, we consider the familiar Bass [6] model, which in our notation can
be written in regression format as
Ot = pomo + (qo − po)COt−1 − qomo CO
2
t−1 + εt (1)
and
Ct = pcmc + (qc − pc)CCt−1 − qcmc CC
2
t−1 + vt (2)
for original and falsified products, respectively. The parameters p and q characterize the shape of the
diffusion pattern, and determine the location of the inflection point I which can be calculated as
I =
1
p + q
log(
q
p
) (3)
The parameters in the Bass model may be difficult to estimate in case the data does not yet
include the inflection point. If this happens, we replace the Bass model by the symmetric logistic curve,
given by
OCt =
mo
1 + exp(−γo(t− Io)) (4)
and
CCt =
mc
1 + exp(−γc(t− Ic)) (5)
for original and falsified products, respectively. Here the parameter γ characterizes the shape of the
curve, and again I corresponds with the timing of the inflection point. Due to the imposed symmetric
nature of the logistic curve, one can still reasonably adequately estimate the location of the inflection
point, even when it is not included in the sample. The estimation routine is Nonlinear Least Squares.
In both cases, that is the Bass model and the logistic curve, our interest lies in the parameters m, which
is the ultimate level of total shipments, and I, which is the location of the inflection point.
In Table 1 we present the present the estimates of the total level. We also compute the fraction of
mc over mo + mc. As said, this latter fraction is most relevant for our purposes. Table 1 suggests that it
can range from about 0.3 to 0.5, with an average close to 0.4. In words, about 40% of the eventual total
shipments in medical products in Suriname could concern falsified products. It is interesting to see
that the variation of the estimate of the fraction across the five product categories is quite small.
Table 1. Fraction of falsified shipments over total shipments, based on estimates of the eventual
total level.
Variable
Estimated Total Level
Original Falsified Fraction
(A) Pharmaceutical items 396,066 148,209 0.272
(B) Medicine, for sale small scale 1,283,915 1,262,614 0.496
(C) Medicine, not for sale small scale 4,463,491 2,128,846 0.323
(D) Wound-covering materials 582,769 386,618 0.399
(E) Blood items 372,778 267,351 0.418
Average 0.382
Note: The Bass model is used for (A), while the logistic model is used for (B), (C), (D) and (E).
Table 2 gives the estimates of the inflection points. For two of the five categories, the years with
these points coincide. For Medicine, not for sale small scale, the inflection point of falsified products
occurred earlier, suggesting that the total level for this series is attained earlier than for the original
products. For two categories the falsified series peak later, with Blood Items meaning that in the next
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few years after 2008 still a substantial amount of falsified products will be imported in Suriname, at
least, if the current situations persists.
Table 2. Estimated inflection points for original and falsified shipments.
Variable
Estimated Inflection Point
Original Falsified
(A) Pharmaceutical items 1999 1999
(B) Medicine, for sale small scale 2010 2010
(C) Medicine, not for sale small scale 2008 2006
(D) Wound-covering materials 2005 2006
(E) Blood items 2013 2018
Note: The Bass model is used for (A), while the logistic model is used for (B), (C), (D) and (E).
3.2. Methodology for Shipments
The graphs in Figures 1–5 seem to suggest that shipments of original and of falsified products
show similar diffusion patterns. It is of interest to see if one of the two series is leading (or lagging).
To examine leads and lags relations, we estimate a vector autoregression of order 1 (VAR(1)),
which consists of the following two equations
Ot = µ1 + β1Ct + ρ1Ot−1 + δ1Ct−1 + εt (6)
and
Ct = µ2 + β2Ot + ρ2Ot−1 + δ2Ct−1 + νt (7)
Note that a genuine VAR(1) model would not include current Ct and Ot, but here it allows for a
partial correction for current effects. The test of interest concerns the joint significance of ρ1, δ1 in (6)
and of ρ2, δ2 in (7).
In Table 3 we present the p values of the F tests. Except for the category Medicine, not for sale
small scale, we find that these parameters are not significantly different from zero. For the exceptional
category, we learn that lagged shipments of originals leads current shipments of originals. So, in sum,
there is no leading or lagging variable across originals and falsified products.
Table 3. p-values of the F test for the joint relevance of one-year lagged shipments of original products
and one-year lagged shipments of falsified products (Each equation contains an intercept and current
sales of the other variable).
Variable
Dependent Variable
Original Falsified
Pharmaceutical items 0.933 0.806
Medicine, for sale small scale 0.119 0.382
Medicine, not for sale small scale 0.038 0.325
Wound covering materials 0.389 0.840
Blood items 0.653 0.529
Table 4 gives the contemporaneous correlation between the two series, and it is quite evident that
this correlation is high.
Hence, we find that original and falsified medical products follow similar diffusion patterns,
and that no series is leading or lagging the other series. When it is assumed that all individuals
in Suriname are equally likely to need medical products, our findings suggest that the shipments
apparently address two distinct segments of consumers. There is a demand for original products
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and there is a demand for falsified products, with the relative demand for originals in the end being
1.5 times as large as demand for falsified products, as the fraction of falsified products in the total
shipments is 40%.
Table 4. Correlation between shipments of original products and of falsified products.
Variable
Pharmaceutical items 0.973
Medicine, for sale small scale 0.914
Medicine, not for sale small scale 0.871
Wound covering materials 0.835
Blood items 0.932
Average 0.905
4. Health Care in Suriname
We now proceed with an in-depth analysis of who the two distinct segments of consumers might
be, that is, which characteristics qualify these two groups?
For that purpose we set out a survey amongst Surinamese individuals in Suriname. Suriname is a
country with a low-income economy, which has a population of approximately 534,000 inhabitants
(GBS 2013). It is estimated that more than 60% of the Surinamese population is below international
poverty levels, while there also is a non-negligible group of multi-millionaires in this country. Although
average welfare has been reported to be on the rise, the income inequalities in Suriname are quite large.
As is the case in countries all over the world, in Suriname the main responsibility concerning
public health lies in the hands of the Surinamese government. Its Ministry of Health (MOH) is the
government agency in Suriname which is responsible for ensuring the quality of health care and the
formulation of pharmaceutical policy, including monitoring its quality. There is a National Medicines
Policy 2004–2008 (NMP), which depicts the policy of the MOH with respect to the supply of medicines
in Suriname. Important aspects of the NMP include ensuring the availability and accessibility of the
selected essential medicines for the entire population, strengthening regulation bodies, and establishing
a national quality control laboratory [7]. With regard to the quality control of medicines, the MOH
reported that it has arranged and monitored the efficacy and safety of the drugs regulation in Suriname
in accordance with the WHO recommendations [8], [9].
In order to safeguard quality control, the MOH has regulation bodies (Registration Authority,
Pharmaceutical Inspection) in place and it is reported that the MOH works closely with other regulatory
and enforcement institutions such as the Inspection of Customs and Excise, the departments of the
Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Police Corps of Suriname [9]. In addition, the MOH has
partnerships with the professional association of Pharmacists in order to determine the Surinamese
Pharmacy Standard as a guide for self-regulation and other matters relating to the profession and
service. MOH also partners with other countries in their region, with which it exchanges information
about the quality of imported medicines as well as with producers to detect any wrongdoing [9].
In summary, the [9] reports that the quality of drugs which enter Suriname through official
channels (particularly pharmacies) and which are distributed in this country can be deemed as good,
due to the fact that: (1) all of these drugs are recorded in the register of packaged drugs; (2) all of these
drugs are subjected to a quality control; and (3) in the entire distribution and sales channels these
drugs are under the supervision of qualified pharmacists.
In spite of the abovementioned claims on the part of the MOH, one of the leading newspapers
in Suriname reported in 2011 that no less than 85% of total sales in the legal circuit in the country
concerned fake (SFFC) medicines (newspaper De Ware Tijd 17 September 2011, p. 1). This figure was
adopted from an investigation on the prevalence of fake (SFFC) medicines in Suriname, which was
reported to have been done by a private investigation agency on behalf of Pfizer (one of the largest
pharmaceutical companies in the world). Despite the press release issued in their defence suggesting
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that the claim was incorrect and that there was no such evidence, the [9] to date has seemed to fail to
present solid documentation to underpin their arguments.
An investigation regarding the strengthening of the pharmaceutical quality assurance and
legislation (from 2008 to 2010), which was commissioned by the MOH and which was done by
Health Research For Action (HERA), shed light on some key concerns [8]. These concerns are that,
although quality is central in the formulated NMP and even though this policy was prepared in
accordance with the WHO recommendations on how to develop and implement a national drug policy
and which was approved by the Government of Suriname in 2005, the applicable laws and regulations
in the field of medicinal products are still obsolete. The current legislation appears incomplete and
relies on the Medicines Act dating from 1896.
Also, while the MOH is able to guaranty the quality of the drugs that are formally admitted and
legally imported, the quality of all other drugs outside these official processes cannot be guaranteed. It
was also reported that there is little control on processes in the informal market. There is also a lack
of routine sampling on the market, and the only quality control laboratory in Suriname is that of the
Drug Supply Company Suriname (DSCS) (“Bureau Geneesmiddelen Voorziening Suriname”). This
laboratory occasionally performs tests at the request of the Pharmaceutical Inspection, even though the
DSCS laboratory has limited capacity and seemed to have performed without (adequate) professional
guidance for years. Furthermore, DSCS itself is one of the largest importers of drugs in Suriname and
therefore may not be seen as an independent institute. So, although the MOH attached importance to
establishing a national quality control laboratory in Suriname (as stated in the NMP), to date there is
no independent quality control laboratory for drugs in the country.
In addition, [8] shows that even though the MOH has several partnerships, there is
insufficient professional consultation between the authorities concerning registration, inspection,
pharmacovigilance (drug safety), the MOH and Council for the Essential Medicines Program (“Raad
voor het Essentieel Geneesmiddelenprogramma”), and as a result the regulatory system cannot
guarantee the quality of all drugs on the market. There is also no structural exchange of information
between countries with stringent medicine regulatory systems in order to optimize the system. Also,
the database of registered medicines is not accessible online, it is also inadequately automated, it is
only accessible for professionals, and the applications that the professionals submit are only processed
by hand.
Hence, taking all the above together, it seems that the Surinamese government apparently has a
long way to go before they will be able to ensure that the quality of drugs on the Surinamese market
meets the requirements set by the WHO (that is, in the formal system, and also reducing the size of the
informal system).
With regard to the availability of medicines in Suriname, it is the case that some medicines are
only available in pharmacies on a doctor’s prescription, while other medications can be purchased
without such a doctor’s prescription, in either a pharmacy, a drugstore or sometimes even in shops
and supermarkets. Concerning the medicines that are available to the Surinamese people, it is their
health insurance company (or insurer, which could be the government again) that determines which
medicines (the variety, the amounts, the brands and therefore the quality of medicines) pharmacies can
provide to the clients on doctor’s prescription. Although health insurance companies have to comply
with the NMP, each health insurance company (insurer) has its own medicines register containing those
medicines of which the cost are reimbursed by them, provided that these medicines are prescribed by
a doctor. Bear in mind that HERA reports that there is an inadequately functioning (quality) control
mechanism for pharmaceutical products. Below we will see that insurance is apparently a key factor.
Regarding the coverage of medical costs of the people in Suriname, the Pan American Health
Organization (2010, p. 6) reported that the medical costs of approximately 34% of the Surinamese
population are covered by private health insurance, company plans, or paid out-of-pocket. The State
Health Insurance Fund (SHI) (“Stichting Staatsziekenfonds”) covers the medical costs of 26% of the
Surinamese population. The majority of individuals who are insured by this health insurance company
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are employees of the Surinamese government, who are obliged to purchase their health insurance from
this health insurer. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Housing (MSAH) covers the medical costs of
31% of the Surinamese population, who are coined as the under-privileged. The medical costs of the
remaining 8% of the Surinamese population are covered by the Foundation Medical Mission Primary
Health Care Suriname (FMM) (“Stichting Medische Zending Primary Health Care Suriname”), which
is a private, non-profit, primary health care organization which focuses on communities in the interior
part of the country and which is subsidized by the MOH for a great part.
5. Collecting Survey Data
In order to select the sample from the population of Surinamese people from the age of 18 and
living in Paramaribo, we employed a multistage cluster sampling technique. GBS drew 30 clusters
in Paramaribo (the capital city of Suriname) from which 20 households were selected. Each cluster
had a pointer address providing the interviewers the first household where a respondent should be
interviewed. The 19 remaining households in every cluster were selected by using a specific method.
This method entails that the total of prospective 600 respondents from the 30 clusters (each with 20
households) were selected using the ‘birthday rule’.
Data collection lasted about six weeks in February and March 2013 and the survey response
rate was 52%, which amounts to 311 respondents. Most of the 298 prospective respondents who
did not cooperate either refused to participate, of whom, interestingly enough, the majority of these
respondents were people living in elite neighbourhoods, or they were not available for an interview
even after repeated visits by the interviewers. It might be that the survey response is influenced by
the fact that there have been several survey studies on other topics prior to this study, particularly
in Paramaribo. Consequently, various prospective respondents had the impression that they were
approached to partake in a study in which they had already participated. The majority of these
respondents did not even give the interviewers the opportunity for further explanation.
6. Results from the Survey
When we asked 311 individuals how often they have, consciously, purchased falsified medicines,
we had 283 valid cases with 71% who said “never”, and hence 29% said “not never”. 13% of the
respondents answered with “Rarely”, 10% with sometimes, 4% with “often” and 6 individuals (2%)
said “very often”. Of the 311 respondents who participated in this survey, 58% were females and 42%
were males.
40% of all respondents had a monthly income with a maximum of Surinamese Dollar SRD800
(approximately Euro183 or USD 246). The monthly income for the 2 subsequent categories (between
SRD800 and SRD1200 and between SRD1201 and SRD2000) was about 25% for each category. Only
11% of all respondents had a monthly income of at least SRD 2001 (approximately Euro616 or USD470).
A histogram is provided in Figure 6.
Even though, in general, not more than 40% of the respondents had a monthly income of SRD800
or less, among those who are subsidized by the government this number was 64%. Irrespective of
whether the costs of their health insurance were co-paid or fully paid by the employer (a distinction
which is further ignored), 69% of all the participating respondents had some kind of health insurance.
Among the remaining 31% of the respondents, only 8% were fully uninsured and paid their medical
bills themselves (out-of-pocket). The other 23% of this group of respondents was either subsidized by
the government through MSAH or through FMM.
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Amo g thos respondents who paid for their health nsu ance (the insured who eithe paid
the r health insurance themselves or whose employer co-paid or fully paid the health insurance, a
distinction which is also further ignored in this i vestigatio ), 77% of them were insured by the SHIF,
22% were insured by a private health insurance company, and just 1% of all insured respondents were
insured by both SHIF and a private health i surance company.
In our following analyses the respondents with a SHIF healt insura ce as well s one by a priv te
insurance company are categ rized under those who are i sured by a private insurance company, as
this group accounts for only 1% f all respondents. This is because these insurance plans are ofte
perceived a being more favorable than those of SHIF, which is because private insurance companies
often offer more elaborate insurance packages.
With regard to the r spondents who are insured, only 36% indicated to have always had all the
cost for medicatio s reimbursed. In this category, those who are only insured by a private health
insurance company (not the SHIF) represent th majority (62%). Just 27% f the respondents who were
only insured by SHIF indicated to have alway had all the costs for medications reimbursed.
Irrespective of how the medical expenses of the r sponde s are covered, about 80% of them
indicated they have never suspecte in the past that medication t ey o tai ed from a pharmacy, thus
through official channel (on doctor’s prescription), could hav been an SFFC medication. Only
26% of the r spondents who suspect to have obtained SFFC medic tion via the official channel did
not use these (supposed SFFC) medicati ns. Almos one third of all respondents (27%) used these
supposed SFFC medic ions often or more f equently aft obtaining them.
When we evaluate the correlat ons across the answers to the question of whether on consciously
purchased falsified medici es (with answ rs Never, Rarely, Occasionally, Often and V ry o ten) with
vari us demographics in Table 5, we see that the only significant c rrelation appears for the way
people are insured. Hence, none of the variables of gender, income, age, or size of household associates
with the co scious use of falsified products.
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Table 5. Pearson Chi-square p-values of correlation between “conscious purchases of falsified medicines
and demographics.
The way health insurance is organized 0.001
Which health insurer? 0.731
Gender 0.636
Age 0.334
Personal monthly income 0.214
Household monthly income 0.555
Number of adults in household 0.327
Number of children in household 0.369
Total number of household members 0.136
When we zoom in on the insurance variable in Table 6, which portrays the results to the question
on the frequency of the consumers’ use of falsified medicine, we see that the answer “Never” is given
more often than expected by individuals who: (D) have a health insurance at a private company;
(E) have insurance via relatives (for example parents); and (F) who state that their employer takes care
of their insurance. At the same time, the answers “Rarely” and “Occasionally” are given more than
expected by people who answer: (A) “I have no health insurance”; and (B) “the Ministry pays for my
insurance due to my lack of income”.
Table 6. Type of insurance against frequency of use of falsified medicine.
Answer to Question:
Never Rarely Occasionally Often Very Often Insurance
A 18 6 + 0 2 0
B 34 11 + 14 + 1 1
C 1 0 2 0 0
D 31 + 3 1 3 + 0
E 28 + 3 3 1 0
F 80 + 13 7 4 4 +
G 1 0 1 0 0
H 2 0 0 0 1 +
+ Fraction more than expected; A: I have no health insurance; B: The Ministry pays for my insurance due to my lack
of income; C: FMM pays for my insurance; D: I have a health insurance at a private company; E: I have insurance
via relatives (for example parents); F: My employer takes care of my insurance; G: I am insured via my employer
and via someone else; H: I am insured via my employer and at a private company.
These results clearly indicate that the way people are insured marks a dichotomy. Poor insurance
associates with more conscious purchases and use of falsified medication.
7. Discussion of Results and Implications
In addition to the available global estimates of the WHO, we provided detailed estimates of
shipments of original and falsified medical products in the South American country of Suriname. The
precise numbers of these estimates are not particularly relevant, as we are interested in the relative
numbers and the current and dynamic correlations across the two series. When we analyze the
diffusion patterns, we see that total shipments (to be observed many years from now) will cover about
40% falsified products. Moreover, we see that current correlation is high, and that there are no relevant
leads or lags. Hence, the two types of shipments seem to address two distinct clusters of consumers.
And, indeed, when we collect survey data for Surinamese individuals we see that these clusters seem
to associate with the way the individuals are insured. Properly insured people have a smaller tendency
to purchase consciously falsified medicine. Here we foresee an important role for the government.
For Suriname we emphasize that the battle against falsified pharmaceutical products is one that
asks much effort on the part of the Surinamese government, in particular in relation to insurance. As a
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member of the WHO, this country needs to make greater effort to adopt the WHO schemes and to make
more use of the information, instructions, and opportunities presented by this organization’s global
coalition of stakeholders, that is, the International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce
(IMPACT). The Surinamese government needs to tighten the relevant legislation and regulations
so that substantial fines and even more appropriate prison sentences can be declared against those
persons and organizations who engage in the import and sale of falsified pharmaceuticals. Given our
results, we also recommend that the control with regard to the market of medical products, not only in
the official distribution channel, is increased and regulations with respect thereto is tightened. Most
certainly, control in the official distribution channel for medical products must be intensified.
At the same time, the Surinamese government needs to raise the awareness of the citizens. As it
is assumed that the majority of the citizens have no background information on the pharmaceutical
products they use, let alone on how to detect falsified versions among the original pharmaceuticals (in
those cases where possible), the government must take the leading role in empowering the citizens by
adequately informing them about how to determine the originality of pharmaceuticals. The Surinamese
government must also inform the inhabitants about the fatal consequences of falsified versions of
pharmaceutical products, and thus the great health risks these products may inflict on those who
use them. The tightening of the government’s policy in the battle against falsified pharmaceuticals is
very likely to result in a significant reduction of the trade in these products in Suriname, and hence
reduce the risk of exposure to the dangers of these products. As mentioned earlier, not only legislation
and regulation policy needs to be tightened, but also the policy regarding control and the effective
implementation thereof, needs to be taken into account.
Additional to the Surinamese government, there are at least three stakeholders that can also
play a role in this battle. The first stakeholder is customs. Since it is suspected that large portions
of falsified pharmaceuticals are smuggled into the country, this stakeholder will need to improve its
control concerning the import of these products. Stricter control, combined with tight legislation and
regulation will enable the custom officials to increasingly contribute to reducing the import of and the
trade in falsified pharmaceuticals.
The second stakeholder, MOH, and more particular the Pharmaceutical Inspection, the control
mechanism of the Surinamese government with regard to the pharmaceutical products, is responsible
for inspecting and controlling the pharmaceutical market. This department is supported by the Office
for Pharmaceutical Supply in Suriname. The latter focuses on the quality controls of locally produced
and imported drugs. The Pharmaceutical Inspection, small in size, may lack the capability to optimally
inspect and control the pharmaceutical business in Suriname. We suggest that the government increases
its support to these organizations.
The final stakeholder is the consumer. As the consumer (thus the individuals, but also hospitals
and similar institutions) ultimately determine the extent to which the sale of products increase or
decrease, this stakeholder also needs to participate in reducing the trade in falsified pharmaceuticals
in Suriname. Of course, before consumers are able to consciously choose to purchase and use original
pharmaceutical products, first and foremost they will need to be adequately informed about the
disadvantages of falsified pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, they will need to be informed about how to
detect the falsified pharmaceuticals from the original versions, in those instances where this is possible.
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Appendix A. Import from Countries
Table A1. Imports from countries.
Countries
Product Category
A B C D E
Antigua x x
Dutch Antilles x x x x
Aruba x
Australia x x
Austria x x
Bahamas x
Barbados x x x
Belgium x x x x x
Brazil x x x x
Canada x x x x x
China x x x x x
Colombia x x x
Costa Rica x x
Cyprus x x
Denmark x x x
Egypt x
El Salvador x
United Emirates x
French Guyana x x x x
France x x x x x
Germany x x x x
Greece x
Guatemala x x
Guyana x x x
Hungary x
India x x x
Indonesia x x x
Israel x
Ireland x x
Italy x
Jamaica x x
Japan x x x
South Korea x x x x x
St Lucia x
Mexico x x
Namibia x
Netherlands x x x x x
New Zealand x x
Niger x
Norway x
Panama x x x x
Portugal x x
Puerto Rico x x x x
Russia x
San Marino x
South Africa x
Spain x
Sweden x x
Switzerland x x x x
Taiwan x x
Thailand x x x x
Trinidad and Tobago x x x x
United Kingdom x x x x
United States x x x x x
Venezuela x
(A) Pharmaceutical items; (B) Medicine, for sale small scale; (C) Medicine, not for sale small scale; (D) Wound
covering materials and (E) Blood items.
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Appendix B. Percentage of Products that Is Falsified (Based on the Software Piracy Rate,
www.nationmaster.com, Consulted December 2009)
Table A2. Countries and fraction of falsified products.
Antigua 50 Dutch Antilles 50
Aruba 50 Australia 28
Austria 25 Bahamas 50
Barbados 50 Belgium 25
Brazil 59 Canada 33
China 82 Colombia 58
Costa Rica 61 Cyprus 50
Denmark 25 Egypt 60
El Salvador 81 United Emirates 35
French Guyana 42 France 42
Germany 27 Greece 58
Guatemala 80 Guyana 50
Hungary 42 India 69
Indonesia 84 Israel 32
Ireland 34 Italy 49
Jamaica 50 Japan 23
South Korea 43 St Lucia 50
Mexico 61 Namibia 50
Netherlands 28 New Zealand 22
Niger 50 Norway 29
Panama 74 Portugal 43
Puerto Rico 44 Russia 73
San Marino 50 South Africa 34
Spain 43 Sweden 25
Switzerland 25 Taiwan 40
Thailand 78 Trinidad and Tobago 50
United Kingdom 26 United States 20
Venezuela 87
Note: When a country does not appear on the list, we use the score 50.
Appendix C. The Data
Table A3. Shipments of original and falsified products: Pharmaceutical items, general (in kilograms).
Year Original Falsified
1996 6984.570 2437.430
1997 6726.670 2404.330
1998 52,109.53 19,346.47
1999 79,784.10 29,644.90
2000 102,338.1 40,856.93
2001 22,542.07 8584.930
2002 75,868.91 20,278.09
2003 12,747.33 5462.670
2004 12,117.31 7397.690
2005 8025.620 2938.380
2006 8639.090 3554.910
2007 15,909.47 6238.530
2008 15,565.72 10,033.28
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Table A4. Shipments of original and falsified products: Medicine, for sale small scale (in kilograms).
Year Original Falsified
1996 7140.120 3402.880
1997 3721.980 1606.020
1998 1631.590 673.4100
1999 2360.470 818.5300
2000 25,662.14 9946.860
2001 55,775.76 16,261.24
2002 27,512.91 9549.090
2003 22,004.05 7445.950
2004 16,083.69 6314.310
2005 30,502.89 17,907.11
2006 43,727.94 24,332.06
2007 120,884.8 164,090.2
2008 56,326.23 32,061.77
Table A5. Shipments of original and falsified products: Medicine, not for sale small scale (in kilograms).
Year Original Falsified
1996 82,410.42 34,027.58
1997 126,437.3 53,107.74
1998 87,937.55 42,676.45
1999 66,519.33 45,686.67
2000 129,504.3 70,367.69
2001 91,668.09 48,919.91
2002 88,133.77 42,033.23
2003 237,083.1 105,841.9
2004 176,400.2 101,030.8
2005 413,139.4 479,416.6
2006 284,124.9 200,984.2
2007 278,071.7 127,044.3
2008 302,822.2 141,556.8
Table A6. Shipments of original and falsified products: Wound covering materials (in kilograms).
Year Original Falsified
1996 21,680.89 11,375.11
1997 25,731.19 26,771.81
1998 18,485.60 8128.400
1999 10,025.28 6677.720
2000 23,374.10 10,868.90
2001 28,716.47 17,209.53
2002 20,663.89 14,954.11
2003 45,351.56 23,804.44
2004 48,713.34 23,512.66
2005 33,667.00 16,122.00
2006 44,422.59 22,254.41
2007 33,909.00 21,029.00
2008 52,893.00 38,540.00
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Table A7. Shipments of original and falsified products: Blood items (in kilograms).
Year Original Falsified
1996 1007.850 364.1500
1997 12,778.71 11,796.29
1998 6391.800 2106.200
1999 2160.360 838.6400
2000 3251.140 1259.860
2001 3112.780 1131.220
2002 731.4600 370.5400
2003 5704.680 3990.320
2004 16,571.03 6558.970
2005 8564.730 3352.270
2006 1759.190 777.8100
2007 2634.270 1126.730
2008 45,435.90 17,764.10
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